

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 KARACH 00942 260348Z
ACTION SY-05

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 MCT-01 /017 W
-----261023 055860 /23 10

R 260300Z FEB 77
FM AMCONSUL KARACHI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1357
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L KARACHI 0942

DEPT FOR DASS, NEA, A/SY/OPS/FO AND A/SY/T FROM RSS GARRETT

ABU DHABI PLEASE PASS DUBAI

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ASEC
SUBJECT: RSS INSPECTION-SY IMPROVEMENTS-COUNTER TERRORISM

1. DURING PERIOD FEB 8 TO FEB 20 RSS VISITED ADDRESSEE
POSTS PRIMARILY TO EVALUATE THE PRACTICALITY OF APPLYING MINIMUM
SY STANDARDS TO PUBLIC ACCESS AREAS AT THESE TYPE POSTS, AS
WELL AS ROUTINE CONSULTATION.

2. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MUSCAT, THE HOST GOVERNMENTS OF
EACH OF THE ABOVE LISTED POSTS ACTIVELY SUPPORT THE PLO WITH
MANY PALESTINIANS IN COUNTRY WHO RATHER FREELY MOVE IN AND
OUT. AS NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE TOWARD A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT
THERE WILL BE NEED FOR COMPROMISE ON BOTH SIDES.
REJECTIONISTS, MILITANTS AND SPLINTER GROUPS MAY WELL BE
FORCED TO DEMONSTRATE OPPOSITION, IN THE FORM OF TERRORIST
ATTACKS, TO ANY PROPOSALS, CONCESSIONS, OR AGREEMENTS
MADE. IF PROSPECTS FOR A GENEVA CONFERENCE THIS YEAR
DIMINISH OR ARE ELIMINATED WE MUST BE PREPARED FOR SOME
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 KARACH 00942 260348Z

TYPE OF RENEWED TERRORIST ACTIVITY.

3. TO PROTECT AGAINST THIS VERY REAL THREAT, AS WELL AS FROM
OTHERS, WE HAVE TAKEN A HARD LOOK AT OUR CURRENT DEFENSES
AND HAVE CONCLUDED THAT OUR CAPABILITIES ARE INDEED LIMITED.
WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO SCREEN VISITORS THAT MAY BE
CARRYING DEADLY WEAPONS NOR ARE WE CURRENTLY ABLE TO PREVENT

THEIR READY ACCESS TO INSTALLATION OFFICES.

4. WHILE EACH POST, EXCEPT DUBAI, HAVE HOST GOVERNMENT POLICE PROTECTION, THIS ALONE HAS NOT PROVED TO BE MUCH OF A DETERRENT, AS EVIDENCED BY OPEC AS WELL AS THE RECENT ATTACK UPON THE SYRIAN EMBASSY IN ISLAMABAD.

5. IN LIGHT OF RECENT STUDIES ON MINIMUM SY STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC ACCESS AREAS, WE HAVE SUBMITTED PROPOSALS TO EACH POST WHICH WOULD PROVIDE THE NECESSARY CONTROLS, SCREENING AND INSPECTION TO MINIMIZE AN ARMED TERRORIST ATTACK. THESE PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN FULLY DISCUSSED WITH APPROPRIATE POST PERSONNEL AS WELL AS RESPECTIVE AMBASSADORS WHO HAVE AGREED WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS MADE. THE "PACKAGE" PROPOSED TO EACH POST INCLUDED INSTALLATION OF ARMORED GUARD BOOTHS, WALK-THRU METAL DETECTORS, ALERT ALARMS, INSPECTION BOXES AND OTHER ANCILLARY ITEMS TO PROVIDE CONTROL, SCREENING AND A DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY. TIED TO THIS IS A NEED AND A PROVISION TO BETTER UTILIZE HOST GOVERNMENT POLICE ASSISTANCE.

6. THE PROPOSALS MADE CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE BUREAU AND SY. TO ACCOMPLISH, WITHIN ANY MEANINGFUL TIME FRAME, WE RECOMMEND THAT A TECHNICAL SY TEAM, COMPOSED OF ONE TSO AND TWO SEABEES BE DETAILED TO THE GULF STATES TO COMPLETE ALL PROJECTS DURING ONE VISIT TO THE AREA. EVEN THEN, ASSUMING APPROVAL AND FUNDS ARE FORTHCOMING, THIS MEANS SOME LEAD TIME WOULD BE REQUIRED TO WORK UP SPECIFICATIONS, OBTAIN LOCAL MATERIALS, AND

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 KARACH 00942 260348Z

FREIGHT SPECIAL MATERIALS FROM THE STATES.

7. THE RSO, KUWAIT, WITH POST CONCURRENCE, WILL SHORTLY BE SUBMITTING A LIST OF SY RECOMMENDATIONS COVERING KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, DUBAI AND ABU DHABI.

8. PROPOSALS MADE AT MUSCAT WILL REQUIRE RATHER SUBSTANTIAL WORK AND ARE CURRENTLY AWAITING REVIEW AND COMMENT BY THE AMBASSADOR WHO WAS ABSENT DURING THE RSS VISIT.

9. THE RSO KUWAIT WILL BE INSPECTING DOHA IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND WILL DEVELOP PROPOSALS FOR THAT POST.

10. POSTS HAVE EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR FULL SUPPORT OF THE BUREAU AND SY TO IMPLEMENT, WHICH WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN READILY AGREEING WITH THE PROPOSALS MADE. WE SOLICIT FAVORABLE RESPONSE TO THEIR RECOMMENDATION WHICH SHOULD SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCE POST CAPABILITY TO CONTRAVERT A TERRORIST ATTACK.

MOORE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 26-Feb-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977KARACH00942
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770067-0766
Format: TEL
From: KARACHI
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t1977026/aaaaaezt.tel
Line Count: 117
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: ef96acc9-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SY
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 03-Feb-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3370326
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: RSS INSPECTION-SY IMPROVEMENTS-COUNTER TERRORISM
TAGS: ASEC
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/ef96acc9-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009